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A vast body of case law has emerged over the last two decades defining the precise scope of 
equity’s jurisdiction to relieve against undue influence in the specific context of residential 
mortgage transactions. Most of the cases have involved allegations of undue influence by a wife 
against her husband seeking to set aside a mortgage or charge over the family home made in favour 
of a bank or building society.1  In the landmark case of Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien,2 the House 
of Lords clarified the circumstances in which a lender will be put on inquiry as to the circumstances 
giving rise to a presumption of undue influence and, if it is, the steps it should reasonably take to 
satisfy itself that the wife’s consent to act as surety was properly obtained.  The so-called “O’Brien 
defence”, which was further clarified by the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge 
(No. 2),3 has enabled many wives to resile from the mortgage transaction in circumstances where 
the lender has failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence by proof that the charge was 
executed as a result of her free will, usually as a result of her having received independent legal 
advice. 
 
                                                          
1 See generally, M. Pawlowski and J. Brown, Undue Influence and the Family Home, (2002), Cavendish Publishing 
Ltd. 
2 [1994] 1 AC 180, HL. 
3 [2002] 2 AC 773, HL 
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A mortgagee has, however, a number of remedies available to it designed to enforce payment of 
the mortgage debt, which may be pursued either concurrently as soon as the mortgagor is in default 
or successively, until payment is recovered.4 Possession of the mortgaged property is, of course, 
normally sought initially, the lender acting as a secured creditor under the legal charge. But there 
is nothing to prevent the mortgagee from electing to sue the mortgagor on his personal covenant 
and obtaining a money judgment, thereby not relying on his security and acting as an unsecured 
creditor in any future bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, in Alliance & Leicester plc v. Slayford,5 the 
Court of Appeal openly recognised this as an “entirely sensible” practice in many cases. The crux 
of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was that the enforcement of a money judgment against the 
husband (as debtor) would not directly affect his wife, since her equitable interest in the property 
would either be left untouched or, if he was to be made bankrupt and the trustee in bankruptcy 
were to seek a sale of the property, she would not be deprived of any defences available to her by 
virtue of her interest. The point arose in Zandfarid v. BCCI,6 where the bank sought to obtain 
possession of the matrimonial home owned by the wife and husband. The wife raised the defence 
of undue influence and an order for possession was refused. The bank then served statutory 
demands on the husband and wife and petitioned for bankruptcy, giving up its security under the 
legal charge.7 The wife claimed that the bankruptcy proceedings were an abuse of process because 
the bank was seeking to circumvent the wife’s equity in the home by obtaining an order for sale 
by the back door as an unsecured creditor. Jonathan Parker J rejected this argument on the ground 
that the wife would be in no worse position in facing an application for a sale of the property by a 
trustee in bankruptcy, under s.30 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (now s.14 of the Trusts of Land 
and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996), during the first year after the bankruptcy than in facing a 
similar application by a mortgagee as a secured creditor.  
 
Although the courts in both Slayford and Zandfarid appear to have assumed that a wife will not be 
prejudiced in raising her O’Brien defence, regardless of the nature of the proceedings brought by 
the lender, it is evident that, in the majority of cases, this will not prevent the ultimate possession 
                                                          
4 UCB Bank plc v. Chandler (1999) 79 P & CR 270. 
5 [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 1, CA. 
6 [1996] 1 WLR 1420. 
7 An act of bankruptcy will sever any beneficial joint tenancy so that the bankrupt’s share will vest automatically in 
the trustee in bankruptcy: Re Dennis (A Bankrupt) [1996] Ch 80, CA. 
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of the mortgaged property.  The O’Brien defence, if established, does not give rise to any positive 
right in the wife beyond that of a mere defence which will prevent the charge being executed 
against her (as opposed to her husband). In other words, it will operate merely to put her in a 
position as if she had not executed the charge in the first place, but it will not place her in any 
better position in regard to a claim for possession based on her husband’s insolvency. In particular, 
where the application for a sale is made after one year from the vesting of the bankrupt’s estate in 
the trustee in bankruptcy, the court is to assume that the creditor’s interests prevail over all other 
considerations in the absence of exceptional circumstances.8  Given the practice of most lenders 
to wait until the expiry of the one year moratorium in order to avail themselves of this statutory 
assumption, the court will be bound in most cases to order a sale especially as the phrase 
“exceptional circumstances” in s.335A of the Insolvency Act 1986 has been given a very limited 
meaning in the case law. Only in extreme cases, it seems, will the wife’s voice9 prevail over that 
of the lender. This article, therefore, seeks to examine the court’s attitude to applications for a sale 
of the family home brought after one year of the vesting of the property in the debtor’s trustee in 
bankruptcy. It also considers whether arguments based on the wife’s right to respect for her home 
under Article 8 in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 has altered judicial attitudes in 
balancing the competing interests of the wife and her bankrupt husband’s creditors. 
 
 
The relevant criteria 
 
The criteria to be applied to applications made by a trustee in bankruptcy for possession and sale 
of the property under s.14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 199610 are 
                                                          
8 See, s.355A(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
9 Although reference is made throughout this article to the bankrupt debtor’s wife, the same principles would apply 
to cases involving the wife’s bankruptcy where the lender is seeking an order for sale against her co-owning 
husband. Needless to say, this would also apply to same-sex marriages. 
10 In some cases, the application will be made under s.33 of the Family Law Act 1996 depending on how the 
property is owned and occupied. Whichever route is taken, the court may still entertain an application for the sale of 
a co-owned property held on an express trust for sale notwithstanding the existence of a consent order in earlier 
divorce proceedings that the sale should be postponed: Avis v Turner [2007] EWCA Civ 748. A wife’s home rights 
under s.30 of the Family Law Act 1996 are also subordinate to the court’s power to order a sale under s.15(1) of the 
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996: Fred Perry (Holdings) Ltd v Genis [2015] 1 P & CR DG5. 
Different considerations may apply if the wife has commenced divorce proceedings against her husband and is 
seeking a transfer of her husband’s interest in the family home as part of her divorce settlement. Here, the court will 
seek to strike a fair balance between the competing claims of the divorced wife and the husband’s creditors and a 
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currently set out in s.335A(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (inserted by Schedule 3 to the 1996 Act). 
These reflect the repealed provisions in s.336(3) of the 1986 Act as they formerly applied to trustee 
in bankruptcy applications under s.30 of the Law of Property Act 1925. Under s.335A(2) 
(formerly, s.336(4)) of the 1986 Act), whilst the court must have specific regard to the needs and 
financial resources of the bankrupt’s spouse and the needs of any children in determining what 
order to make under a s.14 application,11 it must also consider the interests of the bankrupt’s 
creditors, the conduct of the bankrupt’s spouse, so far as contributing to the bankruptcy, and all 
the circumstances of the case other than the needs of the bankrupt. As in the former s.336(5), there 
is also provision in s.335A(3) that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, on an application 
a year after the property vests in a trustee in bankruptcy, the interests of the bankrupt’s creditors 
outweigh all other considerations.12  
 
 
Applications made after one year of vesting in trustee in bankruptcy 
 
The assumption in the Slayford and Zandfarid rulings, mentioned earlier, is that a wife will not be 
prejudiced by a bank initiating bankruptcy proceedings since she can rely on her O’Brien defence 
(and on the allegations she makes in that context) in any s.14 application brought by the trustee in 
bankruptcy, in just the same way as she could have relied on those matters in an application brought 
by the lender as a secured creditor of her husband. In the words of Jonathan Parker J. in Zanfarid, 
the “balancing act which the court is required to undertake will be precisely the same in each 
case.13  Interestingly, however, in all but one of the bankruptcy decisions preceding the Trusts of 
                                                          
postponed enforcement order may be the only way of achieving justice between the parties if the equity is 
insufficient to enable the charging order to be enforced immediately while leaving sufficient funds available to 
provide adequate protection for the wife’s accommodation. This approach has been held to be in preference to 
deciding which claim should have predominance to the exclusion of the other: Austin-Fell v Austin-Fell [1990] 2 All 
ER 455 and Harman v Glencross [1986] Fam 81. See also more recently, Kremen v Agrest [2013] EWCA Civ 41, 
(when striking a balance between the interests of a husband’s judgment creditor and those of his former wife, the 
interests of the creditor should be respected save to the extent that it was necessary to override them in order to make 
an appropriate provision for the wife and any minor children). 
11 The court is required to make “such order as it thinks just and reasonable”: see. s.355A(2) of the Insolvency Act 
1986. 
12 The statutory presumption is premised on Parliament’s intention to provide a breathing space of 12 months to the 
bankrupt and/or his family to enable them to make alternative financial or living living arrangements. 
13 [1996] 1 WLR 1420, at 1429. 
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Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996,14it was held that the interests of the husband’s 
creditors should prevail over the interests of the wife and any children.15 Post-1996 cases have 
continued this trend recognising that only extreme circumstances (such as the wife’s serious 
illness) will provoke the court’s sympathy in refusing sale or ordering a substantial postponement. 
In Nicholls v. Lan,16 for example, notwithstanding that the wife suffered from chronic 
schizophrenia rendering her circumstances “exceptional” within the meaning of s.335A(3) of the 
1986 Act, Mr Paul Morgan QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court) upheld the decision 
at first instance that the interests of the husband’s creditors should prevail given that the wife was 
the owner of another property (jointly owned with her brother) which could be realised in due 
course in order to meet her husband’s indebtedness and buy out the trustee in bankruptcy’s share 
in the home.  
 
What follows, therefore, is a review of the pre and post-1986 case law demonstrating the inevitable 
cross-fire between the competing interests of the bankrupt’s creditor, on the one hand, and the 
bankrupt’s innocent spouse and family, on the other. The resolution of this “tension” between, 
what Gray17 has described as, “the use value and the exchange value” of the trust property has 
been characterised judicially as “no easy thing”,18 but what emerges, as we shall see, is a model 
which invariably allows the creditor to obtain an immediate order for the sale of the family home 




Pre-1996 case law 
 
The case of Re Holliday19 appears to have been the only reported bankruptcy decision prior to the 
1996 Act in which a sale was not ordered. In that case, however, the bankruptcy petition had been 
                                                          
14 The exception being Re Holliday [1981] Ch 405, CA, where the facts were highly unusual. 
15 See, further, D. Brown, “Insolvency and the Matrimonial Home – Sins of the Fathers: In Re Citro (A Bankrupt)”, 
(1992) 55 M.L.R. 284, at 286-88. 
16 [2006] EWHC 1255. 
17 See, Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, (6th ed, 2009), OUP, at p. 1009. 
18 See, Re Citro (A Bankrupt) [1991] Ch 142, at 150, per Hoffmann J. 
19 [1981] Ch 405, CA. 
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presented by the husband himself as a tactical move to avoid a transfer of property order in favour 
of his wife at a time when no creditors were pressing for payment and he was in a position (in the 
next year or so) to discharge his debts. There was also evidence that it would be difficult to obtain 
another suitable home in the area and that disruption to the children’s education was likely to be 
significant. Not surprisingly, the circumstances were viewed as being exceptional, not least 
because no real hardship would be caused to creditors by postponing sale for a period of five years 
to allow the youngest child to attain the age of 17.  
 
Ten years after Re Holliday, Nourse LJ had the opportunity to review the earlier case law in Re 
Citro20, stating:21 
 
“Where a spouse who has a beneficial interest in the matrimonial home has become 
bankrupt under debts that cannot be paid without the realisation of that interest the voice 
of the creditors will usually prevail over the voice of the other spouse and a sale of the 
property ordered within a short period. The voice of the other spouse will only prevail in 
exceptional circumstances.” 
 
In that case, his Lordship went on to explain that it was not uncommon for a wife (and children) 
to face eviction and be unable to buy a comparable home nearby (or elsewhere) and that this would 
be upsetting for the children’s education. This would not, however, be enough to attract the court’s 
sympathy. According to his Lordship22: 
 
“Such circumstances, while engendering a natural sympathy in all who hear of them, 
cannot be described as exceptional.  They are all the melancholy consequences of debt and 
improvidence with which every civilised society has been familiar.” 
 
Accordingly, sale of the various houses in Re Citro were postponed for no longer than six months.  
Interestingly, Nourse LJ commented on the fact that in Re Holliday, it was highly unlikely that the 
postponement of payment of the debts would cause any great hardship to any of the creditors.  
                                                          
20 [1991] Ch 142, CA. 
21 Ibid, 157. 
22 Ibid, at 157. 
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That, in his view, was the one “special feature” of the case which distinguished it from the other 
bankruptcy cases. In his view, without that feature, the circumstances in Re Holliday would not 
have been treated as exceptional.  
 
The decision in Re Citro was applied and followed in Lloyds Bank plc v. Byrne,23 where the Court 
of Appeal, in a case where the application for sale (under s.30 of the Law of Property Act 1925) 
was made by the bank as chargee24 and not by a trustee in bankruptcy, reiterated that the voice of 
the bank must prevail over that of the wife in the absence of any exceptional circumstances. In that 
case, the bank was faced with an ever mounting debt which could only be satisfied by a sale of the 
matrimonial home, whilst still leaving the wife (and her debtor husband) with enough equity to 
rehouse themselves.   Similarly, in Barclays Bank plc v. Hendricks,25a case also under s.30 of the 
1925 Act, the wife failed to show any exceptional circumstances because she was the owner of 
another house in the same area. The wife asked the court to exercise its discretion to defer a sale 
until her children reached the age of 18 or finished full-time education. She argued that, if she were 
forced to vacate her present home, she would have to compel her husband to leave the second 
house to make way for her, which might bring their present amicable arrangements to an end so 
that he would cease to make the mortgage repayments on the first house. Moreover, the children 
did not wish to leave their current home which was nearer to their school and friends. Laddie J. 
rejected the wife’s arguments, holding that she was in a comparatively favourable position because 
she had another house which she owned and moving her children would not even involve them 
changing schools.  Although the accommodation would be less attractive than the current home 
(and more travelling would be involved), these were “comparatively small” matters and not by any 
means exceptional. The fact that the bank would recover almost 20 per cent of its debt was also 
considered relevant.  His Lordship concluded that the moratorium period should be “as short as 
possible” in the circumstances and “any period more than a few weeks should be avoided if it is 
likely to cause significant hardship to the chargee”.26 
 
                                                          
23 [1993] 1 FLR 369, CA. 
24 Parker L.J. concluded that there was no difference in principle between the case of a trustee in bankruptcy and that 
of a chargee: ibid, at 375. But see now, Mortgage Corporation v. Shaire [2001] 4 All ER 364. 
25 [1996] 1 FLR 258. 




Post-1996 case law 
 
Although it has now been recognised that s.15 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees 
Act 1996 has changed the law on the way in which the court will exercise its power to order a sale 
at the suit of a chargee of the interest of one of the owners of the equitable interest of the home, 
the position regarding cases where one of the co-owners is bankrupt remains unchanged under 
s.335A of the Insolvency Act 1986.27 Thus, although now the court has greater flexibility (because 
it is obliged to have regard to a number of different factors) under s.15 of the 1996 Act as to how 
it exercises its jurisdiction on an application for an order for sale of land subject to a trust of land 
in cases where a co-owner has charged his interest,28 this is not so in cases involving an application 
for sale by a trustee in bankruptcy.  In the latter case, under s.335A(2) of the 1986 Act, although 
the court must have specific regard to the needs and financial resources of the bankrupt’s spouse 
and the needs of any children in determining what order to make, it must also consider the interests 
of the bankrupt’s creditors, the conduct of the bankrupt’s spouse, so far as contributing to the 
bankruptcy, and all the circumstances of the case, other than the needs of the bankrupt. As 
mentioned earlier, however, this balancing exercise is inapplicable where the application is made 
after one year from the vesting of the bankrupt’s estate in the trustee. Here, the court is to assume 
that the creditor’s interests outweigh all such considerations, in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances.29 In most cases, therefore, where the statutory assumption applies, the court will be 
bound to order a sale. If, on the other hand, the circumstances are viewed as exceptional, the 
assumption is dis-applied and the court is obliged to revert to the balancing exercise prescribed by 
s.335A(2) and reach a decision which is just and reasonable having regard to all the factors therein 
set out. 
 
                                                          
27 See, Mortgage Corporation v. Shaire [2001] 4 All ER 364, in which Neuberger J emphasised that it was “quite 
clear that Parliament now considers that a different approach is appropriate in the two cases”: ibid, at 378. 
28 For a full review of the cases on s.15 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, see, M. 
Pawlowski and J. Brown, “Orders for Sale: The Creditor and the Family Home”, Parts 1 and 2, (2012) 42 Family 
Law, at 64-68 and 180-184. 
29 Section 335A(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The bankrupt’s home will cease to be comprised in the bankrupt’s 
estate and vest automatically in the bankrupt at the end of three years beginning with the date of the bankruptcy 
unless the trustee has applied for an order for sale in respect of the home: see, s.261(1) of the Enterprise Act 2002 
inserting s.283A(1-3) into the Insolvency Act 1986. The period of three years may be extended by the court: 
s.283A(6) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
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(i) Wife’s medical condition 
 
Not surprisingly, post-1996 cases have accepted that the wife’s serious illness may qualify as an 
exceptional circumstance.  In Judd v. Brown,30 for example, the wife was undergoing a course of 
chemotherapy which was likely to continue for five to six months and she claimed that her chances 
of recovery would be damaged by stress if the matrimonial home was sold. Harman J, refusing an 
order for sale, held that the wife’s sudden and serious attack of ovarian cancer was an exceptional 
event and clearly distinguishable from problems such as organising substitute housing and 
rearranging children’s schooling, which were foreseeable and long term conditions. Similarly, in 
Re Ravel (A Bankrupt),31 the wife had suffered for many years from paranoid schizophrenia and, 
although she was stable and living at home, her doctor advised her that “adverse life events” (for 
example, a move to a smaller property away from supportive friends and family) could cause a 
relapse of her condition. Blackburne J held that the wife’s circumstances justified a postponement 
of the order for sale for one year to enable suitable alternative accommodation to be found for her 
by the local authority. In his view, six months (ordered at first instance) was insufficient time and 
postponement of the order for five years (as contended by the wife) would be too long for the 
creditors to wait for their money. The case is authority for the proposition that the wife’s illness 
need not be sudden and short term to merit the exercise of the court’s discretion in her favour. 
Indeed, his Lordship opined that circumstances where a person who suffers from terminal cancer 
but whose life expectancy cannot be judged and whose illness, therefore, could properly be 
described as long term and of indeterminate duration, could still be characterised as exceptional, 
justifying no order or, alternatively, a postponement of sale indefinitely.32  
 
Again, in Claughton v. Charalamabous,33 the trial judge concluded that the wife’s renal failure 
and chronic osteoarthritis, the latter imposing severe restrictions on her mobility, amounted to 
                                                          
30 [1998] 2 FLR 360. 
31 [1998] 2 FLR 718. 
32 Contrast, Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v. Bell [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 920, where the Court of Appeal 
held that the wife’s health could only be taken into account as a relevant consideration to the postponement of an 
order for sale, not a reason for refusing it. 
33 [1999] 1 FLR 740. See also, Re Bremner [1999] 1 FLR 912, where the court recognised that the wife had a need 
to remain in the property to care for her terminally ill bankrupt husband.  In Re Mott [1987] CLY 212, Hoffman J 
postponed sale until after the death of the bankrupt’s mother, who was 70 years old, in poor health and who had 
lived in the house for 40 years. The evidence of her doctor was that she would deteriorate if she was forced to move 
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exceptional circumstances under s.335A(3) of the 1986 Act.  He, therefore, suspended the order 
for possession indefinitely (in effect, as long as the wife should continue to live in the property), 
having regard also to the fact that the husband’s creditors would receive nothing from the sale of 
the house of which the proceeds would be consumed in costs. Jonathan Parker J, on appeal, upheld 
the judge’s order, stating that he was entitled to take the view that the wife’s health and immobility, 
with her associated special housing needs and her reduced life expectancy, amounted to 
exceptional circumstances. His Lordship also held that the terms of the suspension order were 
essentially a matter for the discretion of the judge and that an appellate court would not normally 
interfere, unless it was clear that a judge had misdirected himself in law or erred in principle, which 
had not happened in this case. Ultimately, therefore, the question of what constitutes “exceptional” 
is largely a value judgment to be left to the trial judge with very little scope for interference at 
appellate level. In Hosking v. Michaelides,34 however, Mr Paul Morgan QC (sitting as a deputy 
judge) ventured an actual definition of the word “exceptional” to mean “out of the ordinary course, 
or unusual, or special, or uncommon”. Here, the wife’s medical condition was such that the loss 
of the house would be “disastrous” for her and could aggravate her dangerous behaviour both to 
herself and her children. 
 
An important case which deserves closer attention is Nicholls v Lam.35 Applying the meaning of 
the word “exceptional” in Hosking, above, the district judge at first instance concluded that the 
wife’s chronic mental condition rendered the circumstances exceptional so as to dis-apply the 
statutory assumption and engage the balancing exercise required under s.335A(2). For the 
purposes of that sub-section, however, the district judge concluded that there was no relevant 
                                                          
from her home. His Lordship characterised the case as one of extreme hardship, especially as the son’s creditors 
were largely the State in the form of the Inland Revenue and the Department of Health and Social Security.  
34 [2004] All ER (D) 147, (order for possession postponed for six months). The deputy judge applied the definition 
of “exceptional” suggested by Lord Bingham CJ in R v. Kelly [2000] 1 QB 198, CA, in the entirely different context 
of s.2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. The Lord Chief Justice concluded that, to be exceptional, a circumstance 
“need not be unique, unprecedented or very rare but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally 
encountered”: ibid, at 208. 
35 [2006] EWHC 1255. More recently, in Everit v Budhram [2009] EWHC 1219 (Ch), Henderson J characterised the 
bankrupt’s husband as having special needs which brought the case within the exceptional category. The husband was 
significantly affected in terms of mobility and suffering from severe ailments including the after-effects of a stroke 
and diabetes. An order for sale was postponed for a minimum period of one year. The case highlights the point that 
exceptional circumstances cannot include the needs of the bankrupt himself (whether they be financial, medical or 





conduct on the part of the wife and no children to be considered, leaving only the interests of her 
husband’s creditors, her needs and financial resources and all the circumstances of the case (except 
the needs of the husband) to be evaluated in the process of determining what was a “just and 
reasonable” order. One special feature of the case, however, was that the wife was also the joint 
owner of another property that was inhabited by her brother, the other owner. The existence of her 
joint ownership in this property was potentially significant in two ways. First, it was suggested 
that she could go and live at this property with her brother. Secondly, there was the possibility that 
her interest in the property could be realised and with her share of the proceeds of sale she would 
have sufficient to buy out the trustee’s half share in the equity of the matrimonial home. In the 
light of this, an open offer was made on behalf of the wife to the trustee, which provided for an 
order for possession and sale of the home to be suspended in certain circumstances and for a charge 
to be made over the other property in respect of the bankruptcy debt. This offer, however, was 
rejected by the trustee largely on the basis that the creditors would not be likely to receive anything 
towards the payment of the debt in the foreseeable future. In any event, the district judge decided 
he could not make an order reflecting this offer as it would directly bite on the other property 
jointly owned by the brother, which was not the subject of the proceedings. Ultimately, the judge 
ordered that the matrimonial home should be put on the market for sale not earlier than 18 months 
from the date of the order. 
 
On appeal in the High Court, the deputy judge concluded that the district judge’s conclusion that 
he could not make an order on the terms of the wife’s open offer was wrong as he, clearly, did 
have such jurisdiction. The offer contemplated an order for possession (and sale) of the 
matrimonial home with suspension of the orders until the happening of specified events. It was, 
therefore, not dealing with property outside the subject of the proceedings. The next question was 
whether the district judge had exercised his discretion correctly in making the order he did. In this 
connection, as mentioned earlier, an appellate court will be slow to overturn the balancing exercise 
carried out in a lower court unless the trial judge erred in law by leaving out of account relevant 
considerations or taking into account irrelevant matters or was otherwise plainly wrong in his 
conclusion.36 In the instant case, the district judge could not be faulted, particularly in his 
                                                          
36 See, Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v. Bell [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 920, CA. More generally, see, 
Assicurazioni Generali SPA v. Arab Insurance Group: Practice Note [2003] 1 WLR 577, CA. 
12 
 
evaluation of the impact on the wife of her being forced to leave the matrimonial home. He set out 
in detail the devastating consequences to the wife of a forced sale, which he considered would not 
normally have outweighed the detriment to the husband’s creditors of being kept out of their 
money.  The peculiar feature of the case before him, however, was the fact that there was a real 
expectation that the wife would be able to realise her share in the other property and then buy out 
her husband’s trustee in bankruptcy.  Although the consequence of this would be that her brother 
would lose his home, the effect on the wife herself would not be as devastating as losing her own 
home. In the words of the district judge: “the realisation of her interest would be a transient matter 
[which] would arise and when completed pass”. On balance, therefore, the district judge had been 
right to identify a difference between ordering the wife out of her own home and seeking to 
promote a solution where she could stay in the property. In the result, the deputy judge concluded 
that the district judge’s order was unimpeachable, given that there was no compelling reason to 
deny the creditors the realisation of their debt whilst the wife retained a substantial interest in 
another property.  A postponed sale for 18 months (in order to give the wife time to pay off the 
trustee) was, therefore, a just and reasonable solution for both parties.37 
 
(ii) Other personal circumstances 
 
The cases considered so far have dealt with the wife’s physical or mental condition as giving rise 
to exceptional circumstances. More recent case law, however, suggests that the statutory 
assumption under s.355A(3) may be dis-applied where other significant personal and human 
circumstances exist which override the creditor’s purely commercial interest in seeking a 
repayment of his debt.38  In Louise Brittain (the Trustee of the Property of the Bankrupt) v 
Haghighat,39 the wife’s oldest son, aged 25, was severely disabled with quadriplegic cerebral palsy 
                                                          
37 Gray makes the point that “such decisions make it clear that there is little latitude in the operation of the statutory 
discretion and that, even in cases of ‘exceptional’ circumstances, the outcome may be little more than a short 
moratorium on sale”: Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, (5th ed., 2009), OUP, at p. 1014. 
38 A delay, however, of several years, in part caused by the trustee in bankruptcy’s failure to apply for an order for 
sale, which had caused statutory interest to increase and significant costs to be incurred, has been held not to qualify 
as an exceptional circumstance: see, Turner v Avis [2009] 1 FLR 74 and Foyle v Turner [2007] BPIR 43. The fact 
that the proceeds of sale would be sufficient only to pay the trustee’s costs has also been held not to amount to 
exceptional circumstances as it was a common consequence of bankruptcy: Harrington v Bennett [2000] BPIR 630. 
In Foenander v Allan [2006] EWHC 2101 (Ch), an order for sale of the bankrupt’s property was varied as there 
were held to be potentially exceptional circumstances since the amount likely to be recovered in the event of sale 
depended on the outcome of an insurance claim that had been made as a result of severe subsidence at the property. 
39 [2009] EWHC 90 (Ch). 
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requiring continuous care which was provided by her on a daily basis.  The deputy judge ordered 
that the family home be sold, but only after three years so as to allow the family to be rehoused in 
other accommodation suitable to their needs. In the course of his judgment, the deputy judge 
stated:40 
 
“In the ordinary run of cases, where a bankrupt’s house is a matrimonial home shared with 
a spouse and children, the loss of the house to pay the bankrupt’s creditors will almost 
certainly be a misfortune for the family, but will not for that reason by itself mean that the 
circumstances are exceptional.  Typically (if that is the correct way of describing something 
exceptional) but not necessarily what makes the case exceptional will be some unusual 
medical condition.” 
 
In the instant case, the needs of the son were clearly such as to make the circumstances of the case 
exceptional thereby allowing the court to approach the matter by reference to the various other 
considerations with a view to making an order which was just and reasonable.  On the one hand, 
if a sale was refused, the creditors would be deprived of an expectation of receiving anything from 
the bankrupt’s estate in the foreseeable future.  Set against those interests (in having possession of 
the property) were the circumstances of the wife and her three children, in particular, her son’s 
disability. The deputy judge’s decision to defer possession for three years was, therefore, clearly a 
compromise solution which was “far from ideal” but which, nevertheless, provided the “best 
possible balance between the competing interests of those concerned”.41  
 
Each case, of course, falls to be considered on its own merits. In Barca v Mears (Trustee of the 
Estate of Romano Barca),42 an order for possession and sale was resisted on the ground that it 
would disrupt the education of the bankrupt’s son, who had special educational needs.  The son 
stayed with his father for most days of the week.  The father feared that, if he was rendered 
homeless, the help which he would be able to provide his son would be severely curtailed and that 
his son’s progress would cease. The deputy judge, however, concluded that the son’s problems 
                                                          
40 Ibid, at [18]. 
41 Ibid, at 83. The decision was upheld on appeal: [2010] EWCA Civ 1521. 
42 [2005] 2 FLR 1. 
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were not extreme and there was no question of his having to leave his present school since he 
would be able to live in his mother’s home, if necessary throughout the week. 
 
In Martin-Sklan v White,43 the application for an order for sale was made in just less than 12 months 
following the vesting of the house in the trustee in bankruptcy. Accordingly, the trial judge did not 
apply the statutory assumption strictly but, nevertheless, approached the application for sale on the 
basis that the interests of the creditors were a “very important consideration” in balancing the 
competing interests of the parties. In this case, the bankrupt’s wife was an alcoholic who 
periodically left the home to indulge in a period of alcoholism before returning. There were issues 
regarding the safety of the two children and the emotional impact upon them of their mother’s 
chronic condition. Their wellbeing and welfare were being protected by a combination of their 
father, their home and a long-established support network of close neighbours and local school. 
The needs of the children could not, therefore, be characterised as usual or typical consequences 
of the bankrupt’s indebtedness. To that extent, the case was exceptional in so far as it involved “a 
family scarred by the effect of alcoholism” and where “the house sought to be realised was one 
which had very particular properties so far as the family was concerned, having regard to its 
position in a community which was supporting the children against their family difficulties”.44So 
far as the interests of the creditors was concerned, it was highly unlikely that an appropriate delay 
in the sale of the property would cause hardship given that there was a sufficient surplus in the 
value of the property to protect the creditors – indeed, it was evident that they “will do quite well 
out of leaving their money in the estate of the bankrupt”.45 In the result, the order for sale was 
postponed for seven years until the youngest daughter reached 17.   
 
(iii) Likelihood of recovery after postponed sale 
 
                                                          
43 [2006] EWHC 3313 (Ch). 
44 Ibid, at [22]. 
45 Ibid, at [31]. The fact that the creditors are likely to be paid in full after a delay in the sale of the property will not 
always make the case exceptional, especially if the other circumstances of the case do not point in that direction: 
Donohoe v Ingram (Trustee in Bankruptcy of Ian Charles Kirkup) [2006] EWHC 282 (Ch). Much will depend on 
the length of postponement of sale and the extent to which the creditors would suffer hardship by being denied their 
money. The arithmetic may also point to the fact that the creditors will not necessarily be paid in full on an eventual 
sale of the property. 
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In Donohoe v Ingram (Trustee in Bankruptcy of Ian Charles Kirkup),46 it was argued that the fact 
that the creditors were likely to be paid in full with statutory interest, even if the order for sale was 
postponed for a number of years to allow the children to remain in the property until they were 
older, amounted to exceptional circumstances. This was rejected by the deputy judge on the ground 
that there were other circumstances which, taken together, pointed the other way. Moreover, in his 
view, Re Holliday, mentioned earlier, which contained this “special feature”, namely, the 
likelihood of the creditors being paid in full after the postponement of the sale, had to be 
approached with a “degree of caution”.47   Much will depend, of course, on the length of the delay 
in the debt being repaid and the degree of hardship to the creditors who will not receive their 
money for some considerable time. In Re Holliday, the period was five years whereas the length 
of delay in Donohoe was 11 years.  The relevant rate of statutory interest, continuing costs in the 
interim and the likely fees payable to the Department of Trade and Industry may also militate 
against a full recovery of the debt from the eventual proceeds of sale of the property.  On the 
arithmetic alone, therefore, the wife’s argument may fail. 
 
 
The human rights dimension 
 
A separate attack levelled against the deputy judge’s approach in Nicholls v Lam48 to ordering a 
sale of the house was that he had given too much weight to the interests of creditors, particularly 
as there was little evidence as to the actual identity of each of them or the amount of their individual 
debts.  In support of this contention, it was argued that the wife’s right to respect for her home 
under Article 8 in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 should have been fully considered. 
On this point, however, the deputy judge had no hesitation in concluding that the test in s.335A 
was not inconsistent with the qualified nature of the rights protected under Article 8. This was 
because the whole purpose of s.335A(2) was to identify the need to respect the home, but not as 
an absolute objective to be guaranteed in every case but as a consideration in a balancing 
                                                          
46 [2006] EWHC 282 (Ch). 
47 Ibid, at [1]. 
48 [2006] EWHC 1255. 
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exercise.49  So far as the interests of the debtor’s creditors were concerned, it was significant that 
s.335A merely provided that their interests were to be taken into account without prescribing the 
weight to be given to those interests.  This was, therefore, largely a matter for the judge in 
exercising his discretion as to what was fair and reasonable. Moreover, in most cases, there was 
usually little evidence as to the identity of the creditors and their concerns other than the obvious 
desire to receive their money sooner rather than later. In these circumstances, it was not incumbent 
on a trustee to do very much by way of positive evidence as to the creditor’s interests. So far as 
the present case was concerned, the district judge had a statement of indebtedness which provided 
a global sum due to the creditors, the sum for interest and fees and the sum payable to the DTI. 
The fact that the original debt was not broken down to show who all the creditors were was not 
vital to his determination of the main issue.  
 
An Article 8 argument was also raised and failed in Foyle v Turner.50 Here, HH Judge Norris QC 
recognised that the protection of the rights under Article 8 required a balance to be struck between 
the needs of the individual and the needs of the community and for any interference with individual 
rights to be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. However, in his view, the checks and 
balances that had to be carried out under s.335A of the 1986 Act before an order for sale could be 
made, which included looking at the needs of and resources of a non-bankrupt spouse and 
considering whether exceptional circumstances dictated that the needs of the creditors should not 
be put first, were similar to those required under the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950.51 There was, therefore, no need for any separate consideration of Article 8 rights.  
 
The impact of Article 8, however, is not entirely free from doubt. In Barca v Mears (Trustee of the 
Estate of Romano Barca),52 the deputy judge suggested that a possible shift in emphasis in the 
interpretation of s.335A might be necessary to achieve compatibility with a bankrupt’s rights under 
                                                          
49 See also, Jackson v. Bell [2001] EWCA Civ 387, where the deputy High Court judge held that s.335A was 
compatible with Article 8.  The same view was reached by Mr Paul Morgan QC (sitting as a deputy High Court 
judge) in Hosking v. Michaelides [2004] All ER (D) 147. But see, Barca v. Mears [2004] All E.R. (D) 153, where 
the deputy High Court judge considered that there might need to be a shift in emphasis in the interpretation of 
s.335A to achieve compatibility with Article 8. 
50 [2007] BPIR 43. See also, Donohoe v Ingram (Trustee in Bankruptcy of Iain Charles Kirkup) [2006] EWHC 282 
Ch, where the issue of Article 8 rights was largely side-stepped by a finding that, even on a wider interpretation of 
exceptional circumstances, the trial judge’s conclusion that there were no exceptional circumstances was correct. 
51 See generally, Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council [2006] 2 AC 465. 
52 [2005] 2 FLR 1. 
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the European Convention on Human Rights. In his view, the provisions of the 1986 Act ought to 
be regarded as recognising that, in the general run of cases, the creditors’ interests would outweigh 
all other interests, but leaving it open for a court to find that, on a proper consideration of the facts 
of a particular case, it was one of the exceptional cases in which that proposition was not true. In 
the words of the deputy judge:53 
 
“ . .  .it may be incompatible with Convention rights to follow the approach taken by the 
majority in Re Citro, in drawing a distinction between what is exceptional, in the sense of 
being unusual, and what Nourse L.J. refers to as the ‘usual melancholy consequences’ of a 
bankruptcy. This approach leads to the conclusion that, however disastrous the 
consequences may be to family life, if they are of the usual kind then they cannot be relied 
on under s.335A; they will qualify as ‘exceptional’ only if they are of an unusual kind, for 
example where a terminal illness is involved. . . It seems to me that a shift in emphasis in 
the interpretation of the statute may be necessary to achieve compatibility with the 
Convention. There is nothing in the wording of s.335A . . . to require an interpretation 
which excludes from the ambit of ‘exceptional circumstances’ cases in which the 
consequences of the bankruptcy are of the usual kind, but exceptionally severe.” 
 
Despite these tentative remarks, however, the trend of the case law has been not to require the 
operation of a different exercise from that adopted in Re Citro or the strict wording of s.335A(3). 
In Ford v Alexander (Trustee of the Estate of the Appellants),54 for example, Peter Smith J. 
expressly held that the requirements in s.335A(2) and the change of emphasis in s.355A(3) did not 
infringe Article 8 of the Convention.  In his view, they already provided an appropriate balance as 
between the rights of creditors and the respect of privacy and the home of the debtor.  In his 
Lordship’s words:55 
  
“That balance serves the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others. I 
am, therefore, of the opinion that the requirements of s.335A satisfy the test of being 
necessary in a democratic society and thus proportionate (see, McCann v UK (App no 
                                                          
53 Ibid, at [40-41]. 
54 [2012] EWHC 266 (Ch). 
55 Ibid, at [49]. 
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19009/04) and Connors v UK (App no 66746/01). This was the conclusion in the pre 
Pinnock bankruptcy cases and I see no basis for coming to a different conclusion.” 
 
Reference may also be made to Re Karia,56 where Lightman J. was asked to consider whether a 
sale of the property would seriously interfere with the bankrupt’s private and family life and, in 
particular, his relationship with his daughter as he would no longer be able to provide staying 
access for her at his flat. This claim, however, was held to be exaggerated given that the bankrupt 
would be able to obtain an alternative one-bedroom flat using his net income. On the human rights 
point, his Lordship stated: 
 
“The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights makes absolutely plain that 
there has to be a balancing exercise when there is some interference with the right to private 
and family life, between the entitlement of the individual to that right, and the interests, 
rights and freedom of others. For this purpose, the interests of creditors on a bankruptcy 
are factors which have to be counter-balanced against the interference with the individual’s 
rights. The balancing exercise is essentially a matter for national legislation. The national 
legislation in this country in the form of s.335A of the Insolvency Act 1986 effects the 
balancing exercise.” 
 
The conclusion, therefore, that the requirements as set out in s.355A do not infringe Article 8 rights 
finds general support in the English case law.  The courts continue to apply the same test as applied 
in the pre-1986 decisions on bankruptcy, so that exceptional or special circumstances must, in the 





                                                          
56 [2001] WL 1560733. 
57 [1991] Ch 142, at 157. 
58 See, for example, Harrington v Bennett [2000] BPIR 630; Dean v Stout (The Trustee in Bankruptcy of Mushtaq 
Hussain Dean) [2004] EWHC 3315 (Ch); Everitt v Budhram [2009] EWHC 1219 (Ch) and Fred Perry (Holdings) 




It remains to be seen whether lending institutions continue to adopt the practice of suing the 
husband debtor upon his personal covenant with a view to forcing a sale of the matrimonial home 
by his trustee in bankruptcy, notwithstanding the wife’s equity arising from a successful O’Brien 
defence.59 The practice has been alluded to by the writers60 in the slightly different context of an 
application for sale at the suit of a lender (as chargee) as opposed to the debtor’s trustee in 
bankruptcy.  Here, the range of factors the court is obliged to consider, under s.15 of the 1996 Act, 
is wider than under s.335A(2) of the 1986 Act.  But here too, the trend of the recent authorities is 
to afford the interest of the creditor priority over the occupying spouse even in circumstances 
where the effect of the order is to cause considerable hardship to the wife and her resident family.61  
 
Interestingly, as we have seen, in at least two notable cases,62 both the High Court and Court of 
Appeal appear to have assumed that a wife will not be prejudiced in raising her O’Brien defence, 
regardless of the nature of the proceedings brought by the lender. It is submitted, however, that in 
most cases, the O’Brien defence will not prevent the ultimate repossession of the mortgaged home. 
Apart from the tactic of not relying on its security and bringing bankruptcy proceedings against 
the husband (relying instead on the personal covenant as an unsecured creditor), the lender has the 
alternative choice of pursuing the husband as secured creditor against his interest in the house 
which is unaffected by any undue influence argument raised by the wife in respect of her own 
share in the property. In this latter case, as mentioned earlier, it is also open to the lender to enforce 
the charge against the husband’s share and itself apply to the court for an order for sale under s.14 
of the 1996 Act. Whichever route is adopted, however, it seems the court will favour a sale of the 
property with only a relatively short moratorium unless the wife can point to very unusual 
                                                          
59 In the first quarter of 2015 (January to March), there were a total of 20,826 individual insolvencies in England and 
Wales, comprising 4,209 bankruptcies, 6,213 debt relief orders (DROs) and 10,405 individual voluntary 
arrangements. In total, individual insolvencies have generally been on a decreasing trend since 2010. In particular, 
the total number of bankruptcy orders in the 1st quarter of 2015 was 6.6% lower than in the 4th quarter in 2014 and 
22.5% lower than in the same period in 2014. The number of bankruptcy orders has been on a decreasing trend since 
2009, but this may have been affected by the introduction of DROs in 2009. There were 1,062 creditor petition 
bankruptcies in the 1st quarter of 2015, which was 2.3% higher than the last quarter in 2014, but 15.75 lower than the 
same quarter in 2014: see generally, the Insolvency Service Statistics – January to March 2015 (Q1 2015), pp. 12-
16, at https://www.goc.uk/government/collections/insolvency-service-official-statistics. 
60 See, M. Pawlowski and J. Brown, “Orders for Sale: The Creditor and the Family Home”, Parts 1 and 2, (2012) 42 
Family Law, at 64-68 and 180-184. 
61 See, for example, First National Bank plc v. Achampong [2003] EWCA Civ 487.  
62 Zandfarid v. BCCI [1996] 1 WLR 1420 and Alliance & Leicester plc v. Slayford [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, CA. 
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circumstances rendering an order for possession entirely inappropriate.  In cases of bankruptcy, in 
particular, such circumstances tend to be confined to her medical or mental condition and reflect 
the same test, despite the introduction of the human rights dimension, as applied by the pre-1986 
decisions on bankruptcy.  Although other personal circumstances may, as we have seen, be taken 
into account, the overall impression is that these are again confined to cases involving an unusual 
medical condition (quadriplegic cerebral palsy) or disability (alcoholism) suffered by a close 
relative or dependent.  Even a sufficient surplus of equity in the house, enough to meet the 
predicted debt with interest after a postponed sale, may not be enough to bring the case within the 
exceptional category. The overall conclusion, therefore, is that the court’s discretion to refuse (or 
postpone) sale is very limited in all these cases and the lender will normally be able to achieve by 
the back door what it would not have been able to do by the front door, namely, force the wife to 
leave her home so as realise its security.  Only in extreme cases, it seems, will the wife’s voice 
prevail over that of the bank and the human rights dimension has done little, if anything, to alter 
that position. 
 
One rationale for favouring the commercial interests of the creditor is that the trustee in bankruptcy 
is statutorily bound, under s.305(2) of the 1986 Act, to realise the assets of the bankrupt leaving 
him with little choice but to proceed with an application for an order for sale of the family home. 
Coupled with this is the judicial notion, reflected in much of the English case law, that commercial 
agreements should be honoured and respected. A good example of this kind of reasoning is to be 
found in the judgment of Walton J in Re Bailey (A Bankrupt),63 where he observed that:64 
 
“A person must discharge his liabilities before there is any room for being generous. One’s 
debts must be paid, and paid promptly. . .  [The outcome] may be yet another case where 
the sins of the father have to be visited on the children, but that is the way in which the 
world is constructed, and one must be just before one is generous.” 
 
                                                          
63 [1977] 1 WLR 278. In this case, the court was not mindful to postpone sale merely to facilitate a child’s studies at 
a local school for his “A” level examinations. Gray also makes the point that many commercial creditors are 
themselves spouses or partners (with children) and with mortgage responsibilities of their own affecting their homes: 
see, Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, (5th ed., 2009), OUP, at p. 1013, ft. 7. 
64 Ibid, at 283-4. 
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What emerges, therefore, from this analysis is a model premised on the principle that the interests 
of creditors will invariably prevail over family concerns unless there are compelling  reasons for 
refusing (or deferring) sale which are absent from the ordinary run of cases. The model adopted is 
one which advocates the notion that “money talks” so as to deprive the family of its home because 
the borrower must honour his debts above all else.  Despite, therefore, the initial adoption of a 
seemingly neutral stance (contained  s.335A(2) of the 1986 Act) of requiring the court to engage 
in a balancing exercise of the competing interests of creditors against the welfare of the family and 
the needs of the bankrupt’s spouse in determining what order to make within the first year of 
bankruptcy, that neutrality is then abandoned by a statutory presumption in favour of creditors 
(contained in s.353A(3)) after one year of bankruptcy which places the onus squarely on the family 
to persuade the court that “money should not talk” and that personal and family welfare should 
prevail over a sale of the property.  In this commercial model, therefore, the protection of the home 
as a legal concept is inevitably subordinated to purely financial interests once an arbitrary 
“breathing space” of 12 months has passed which is intended to enable the bankrupt and/or his 
family to make alternative financial or living arrangements. 
 
An alternative model, premised on the notion of protecting the rights of persons in the family home 
has, however, found favour in other common law jurisdictions.  In New Zealand, for example, the 
Joint Family Homes Act 196465 allows a couple to register their home as a “joint family home” 
with the consequence that their beneficial interests will be unaffected by bankruptcy for the benefit 
of creditors.  The creditors of either spouse may only oppose the initial registration or challenge 
the joint family home registration on the limited grounds set out in the Act. Moreover, although 
the court has a discretion to cancel any registration in favour of a sale, this cannot be done solely 
on the ground that one of the spouses has become bankrupt. Cancellation (followed by sale) can 
only be ordered in exceptional circumstances where, for example, there has been some form of 
fraudulent dealing, or where both spouses have become bankrupt and there is enough equity in the 
                                                          
65 Although the New Zealand Law Commission recommended in 2001 that the 1964 Act should be repealed, this 
was largely because it discriminated against single owners and couples in de facto relationships and civil unions: 
see, New Zealand Law Commission, “The Future of the Joint Family Homes Act 1964”, (Report 77, December 
2001). Another reason given for repeal was that the number of people registering joint family homes under the Act 
had dropped considerably by 2001 due to a general fall in the marriage rate. Moreover, the Act’s purpose in 
protecting the family home when the husband or wife went bankrupt is now covered under the New Zealand’s 




home from which the creditors can be satisfied without undue hardship to the family.  Interestingly, 
similar schemes providing considerable immunity from the effects of bankruptcy can be found in 
Canadian provincial legislation.66  
 
The priority given to the preservation of the family home in the 1964 Act is radically different 
from the underlying premise of the English legislation. In Fairmaid v Otago District Land 
Registrar,67 North J described the 1964 Act as ensuring that “husband and wife can live 
contentedly in their home in the knowledge that it is secured to them as a family home so long as 
they need it whatever the vicissitudes of life may bring.”  This sentiment is, of course, entirely at 
odds with current judicial thinking in our own country. The recent English case law, notably, 
Nicholls v Lam, Foyle v Turner and Ford v Alexander, involving claims based on the right to 
respect for the home under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did offer an opportunity for 
our own courts to better protect the personal and human interests of innocent spouses and their 
children, but that opportunity was, as we have seen, entirely missed both at first instance and 
appellate level. As Gray has observed:68 
 
“The New Zealand legislation was enacted with the express object of promoting the 
stability and permanence of family life as a higher social end than that represented by 
commercial security for the creditor.  The 1964 Act indeed embodies an imaginative 
attempt to strike a humane social balance between competing interests and it is arguable 
that English law would be enriched by the enactment of similar legislation.” 
 
As things stand at the moment, such novel legislation is, of course, unlikely in our own jurisdiction.  
There is also little hope that the English case law will provide any scope for development of Article 
8 Convention rights in the balancing of commercial and family interests in the context of a 
bankruptcy under the 1986 Act. 
 
 
                                                          
66 See, Gray and Gray, Elements of Land, (5th ed., 2009), OUP, at p. 1017, ft. 11, citing B. Ziff, Principles of 
Property Law, (4ht ed., 2006), Carswell Ontario, at pp. 172-173. 
67 [1952] NZLR 782, at 786. 
68 See, Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, (5th ed, 2009), OUP, at p. 1017. 
